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tions which are primarily pervaded by intimate social relationships"' 
The external impact of exclusion from these organizations is largely 
confined to exclusion of persons from sharing in these relationships, 
traditionally a matter of only private concern. 
It would appear, however, that the judicial trend with regard 
to the problem of exclusion from membership is to view the facts 
of each case individually, concentrating on the type of organization 
and its purpose, the extent of control which it exercises and the 
efffect on other individuals and the public. 
Charles Blaine Myers, Jr. 
31 K.ronen v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 237 Cal. App. 2d 289, 46 
Cal. Rptr. 808 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 905 (1966); Kurk v. Medical Soc'y, 
260 N.Y.S.2d 520 (Sup. Ot. 1965). Note, Judicially Compelled Admm-iOfl to 
Medical Societies, 75 HARV. L. REv. Il86 (1962}. 
Statutes -Vagueness of Phrase "Contributing to 
Delinquency of a Minor" 
The defendant, Ralph Hodges, was convicted of contributing 
to .the delinquency of a minor in the state of Oregon. He appealed 
his conviction, contending that the statute under which he was 
indicted violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Held, reversed and remanded. The statute was unconstitution-
ally vague and thus did not give, adequate notice of what conduct 
was proscribed and consequently ·the judge and jury were allowed 
so much leeway in its application that the law-making (legislative} 
function was effectively delegated to them. State v. Hodges, 457 P.2d 
491 (Ore. 1969). 
The challenged section of the Oregon statute stated that "any 
person who does any act which manifestly tends to cause any child 
to become a delinquent child shall be punished upon conviction. . 
."' "Delinquent child" is defined in a separate section· of the 
'When. a child is a delinquent child as defined by any statute of th.ii; 
state, any person responsible for, or by any act encouraging, r.ausing 
or contributing to the delinquency of such a child, or any person who 
by threats, command or peJSUasion, endeavors to induce any child to per-
form: any act ot follow any course of condU£t which would cause it to 
become a delinquent child, or any person who does any act whkh 
manifestly tends to cause any child to become a delinquent child, 
shall be punished upon conviction by a fine of not more than $1,000, 
or by imprisonment in the county jail for a period not exceeding one 
yea.r or both, or by miprisonment in the penitentiary for a period not 
exceeding five years. 
ORE REv, Sl'AT. § 167.210 (1967). 
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statute as a person whose conduct or condition· is such as to fall 
within the provisions of certain named paragraphs.•· The relevant 
paragraph· used by the court in defining "delinquent child" states 
that a child is delinquent if he is subject to the jurisdiction of the 
junvenile court because his "behavior, condition or circumstances 
are such as to endanger his own welfare or the welfare of others- . 
. ."' By inserting this particular definition of "delinquent child" 
into the contributing to the delinquency statute, the language 
tested for vagueness as applied to the case then reads: "[O] r any 
person who does any act which manifestly tends to cause any 
child to become .... a child subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile 
court because his . "behavior, condition .or circmnsta.nces are such 
as to endanger his own welfare or the welfare of others ... "' 
The majority of the court felt that the statute failed to place 
persons on notice of the law's demands and lent itself to an uncon-
stitutional delegation of legislative power to the judge and jury by 
permitting the jury to. decide the meaning of the law. The law was 
thus too vague to satisfy the requirements of due process of law and 
was declared void. Although three judges specially concurred with 
the majority decision, they did not concur on the question of the 
constitutionality of the statute.• Judge Holman in his specially 
• 'Child delinquency,' 'delinquent child,' 'child dependency' and 'dependent 
child' mean a person under IS years of age whose conduct or condition is such as 
to fall within the provisions of paragraphs (a) to (e) of subsection (1) of ORS 
419.476." ORE. STAT. § 418.205 (1967). (1) The juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction in any case 
involving a person who is under 18 years of age and: 
(a) Who has committed an · act which is a violation, or which if 
done by an adult would constitute a violation, of a law or ordinance 
of the United States or a state, county or city; or 
(b) who is beyond the control of his parents, guardian or other person 
having his custody; or 
(c) Whose behavior, condition or circumstances are such as co endan-
ger his own welf'acre or the welfare of others; or 
(d) Who is dependent for care and support on a public or private 
child-caring agency that needs t.lie services of the court in planning for 
his best interests; or 
(e) Either his parents or any other person having his custody have 
abandoned him, failed to provide him with the support or education 
required by law, subjected him to cruelty or depravity or failed to pro-
vide care, guidance and protection necessary for his physical, mental or 
emotional well-being. • . . 
On:. R.Ev. STAT. § 419.476 (1967). 
• ORE. REv. STAT. § 419.476 (1) (c) (1967). 
4 ORE. REV. STAT. § 167.210 (1967), ORE. REV. STAT. § 419.467 (1) (C) (1967). 
• The indictment returned against the defendant charged that he exposed 
and manipulated his private parts in the presence of a ten•year-old girl. The 
specially concurring opinion reached the same conclusion as the majority because 
2
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concurring opinion felt that there was no trap to the unwary or 
undiscriminating citizen because of the alleged .vagueness with 
which the conduct was described. He felt that the statute as con-
stmed by previous cases• proscribed only those acts which were 
commonly recognized by everyone as tending to produce delin-
quency. Therefore, Judge Holman argued that the statute was 
constitutional because reasonable men would know what was pro-
hibited. 
If a law is so vague and indefinite that it leaves the public 
uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits, and leaves judges and. jurors 
free to decide what it prohibits, it fails to meet the requirements. of 
due process.' It is a question of degree as to whether a statute will 
be declared void on the grounds of vagueness, or whether it lends 
itself to a construction limiting its application to an identifiable 
factual situation. Many courts, including Oregon's have narrowed 
the· construction of criminal statutes where the law was not found 
void on its £ace.• This question of degree of vagueness varies accord-
ing to the rigl?-ts involved and the nature of the statute. Where a 
statute infringes on first amendment rights the test for vagueness 
will be very strict and little effort will be made to save such a 
statute by narrowing its application." When considering criminal 
laws some vagueness can be tolerated if the laws do not trespass on 
first amendment freedoms- The Constitution does not require im-
as a matter of law the judges felt that the actS done by the defendant were 
not such as. would tend to cause delinquency in a. minor. State v. Hodges, 457 P.2d 
491 (Ore. 1969) {specially concurimg opinion). 
•State v. Casson, 223 Ore. 421, 354 P,2d 815 (1960); State v. Peebler, 200 
Ore. 321, 265 P.2d 1081 (1954). 
• See Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 
360 (1964); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939). 
• E.g., United S,tates v. National Dairy ProductS Gorp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963); 
Brockmuller v. State, 86 Ariz. 82, 340 P .2d 992 (1959); State v. Barone, 124 So.2d 
490 (Fla. 1960); State v. Casson, 223 Ore. 421, 354 P.2d 815 (1960),; State v. 
Pee bier, 200 Ore. 321, 265 P .2d 1081 (1954) . 
• See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Thornhill v.· Alabama, 310 
U.S. as (1940). The courts have felt that if a law is vague, and ilirst amendment 
freedoms are involved, the vagueness could inhibit J?el'SODS from exercising 
their constitutional rights for feair that _they might violate the statute. The 
vagueness of the statute would therefore have a · chilling effect on the exercise 
of first amendment rights even though it does not actually prohibit these 
rights. Where the vagueness of a statute does not irifringe on first amendment 
rights the vagueness might inhibit some other lawful acts. The courts, how-
ever, balance the social utility of the acts that :might be inhibited against the 
vagueness of .the statute in determimng whether they should move to protect 
these rights. First amendment rights are alroost always protected by the courts 
therefore little effort will be expended to save a statute by construing it narrowly 
if it creates. a chilling effefct on these basic freedoim. .. 
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possible _standards.. Lack of precision in criminal statu~es is not 
in itself offensive to the requirements of due process. All that is 
necessary is that the language convey a sufficiently definite warning 
with regard to the proscribed conduct when. measured by common 
understanding and practices.'• 
In litigating the constitutionality of similar contributing-to-
delinquency statutes other states have reached a decision different 
than Oregon's.11 In applying the test for vagueness these courts have 
indicated that the scope of the subject forbids an exact definition 
of what constitlites the crime. They have also considered the ap-
parent impossibility of detailing all of the acts which could con-
ceivably fall within the condemnation of the statute. The courts 
have stated that the comm.on sense of the community, as well as 
the sense of decency, propriety, and morality which most people 
entertain, is sufficient to permit the statute to be applied on a case 
by case basis."' Also, such statutes have a long history of common 
law interpretation which renders much language sufficiently clear 
and meaningful which might otherwise be vague and uncertain.1• 
Because of this long history of interpretation, and the sense of pro-
priety which people in a community entertain, the courts have held 
the statutes sufficiently certain and definite to apprise men of 
ordinary intelligence of the conduct prohibited by them. 
West Virginia has a contributing delinquency statute similar 
to Oregon's."' Unlike the Oregon statute, the crime in West Virginia 
includes contributing to the "neglect" of any child, as well as to his 
"delinquency". The section of the West Virginia statute similar to 
that tested for vagueness in Oregon reads: "A person who oy any 
act or omission contributes to, encourages or tends to cause the 
delinquency or neglect of any child, shall be guility of a mis-
"'See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); United States v. Petrillo, 
332 U.S. 1 (1947). 
11 See, e.g., Rrockmueller v. State, 86 Ariz. 82, 340 P.2d m (1959); McDonald 
v. Commonwealth, 331 S.W.2d 716 (Ky. 1960); State v. Montalbo, 33 N.J. Supel', 
462, llO A.2d 572 (1954) ; Commonwealth v. Randall, 183 Pa, Super. 603, 1!13 
A.2d 276 (1957) . 
. ,. See, e.g., State v. Millard, 18 Vt. 574, 46 Am. Dec. 170 (1845) . 
,a E.g., :Srockmueller v. State, 86 Ariz. 82, 340 P .2d 992 (1959). 
'* A person who by any act or omission contributes to, encourages or 
tends to cause the delinquency or neglect of any child, shall be guilty of 
a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not to 
exceed five hundred dollars, or imprisoned in the county jail for a 
period not exceeding one year, or both. 
w. VA. CoDE ch. 49, art. 7, § 7 (Michie 1966) . 
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demeanor .... "'" The terms delinquent child and neglected child 
are also defined in the statute."' These definitions must be read in 
conjunction with the contributing to delinquency statute to under· 
stand what is prohibited. It is here that the question of vagueness 
arises- Subsection (9) of the West Virginia statute defining "delin· 
quent child" is similar to the section used by the Oregon court in 
declaring their statute unconstitutional." It states that a delinquent 
child is a person under eighteen years of age who " [ d] eports him-
self so as to wilfully injure or endanger the morals or health of 
himself or others/''" This definition when read with the contributing 
to delinquency statute results in substantially the same words as 
were declared vague by the Oregon court. 
Subsection (7) of the West Virginia statute defining "delin-
quent child" seems even more susceptible to an argument of vague-
ness." It states that a delinquent child is a person under the age 
of eighteen years who "[a]ssociates with immoral or vicious per-
sons .... ""' -The contributing to delinquency statute under this 
definition would read: "A person who by any act or omission con-
"' Id. 
'" "Delinquent child" means a person under the age of eighteen yean 
who: 
(1) Violates a law or municipal ordinance; . 
(2) Commits an, act which if COIDmitted by an adult would be a cnme 
not pun:ishab1e by death or life imprisonment; 
(3) Is incorrigible, ungovernable, or habitually disobedient and beyond 
the control of his pal'ent, guardian, or other custodian; 
(4) Is habitually truant; 
(5) Without just cause and without the consent of his parent, guard-
ian, or other custodian, repeatedly deserts hi,; home or other place of 
abode; · 
(6) Engages in an occupation which is in violation of law; 
(7) Associates with immoral or vkious persons; 
(8) Frequents a place the existence of which ill in violation of Jaw; 
(9) Deports himself so as to wilfully injure or endanger the moral<! or 
health of himself or others. 
W. VA.. CoDE ch. 49, art. l, § 4 (Michie 1966). 
''Neglected child" means a child under the age of eighteen, years who: 
(1) Is destitute, homeless, or abandoned. 
(2) Has not proper parental rare or guardianship. 
(3). Habitually begs or receives alms. 
(4) Ry reason of · neglect, cruelty, or disrepute on the part 'of parents. 
guardians, or other persons in whose care the child may be, is living 
in an improper place. 
(5) Is in an environment warranting the appaintment of a guardian 
under this article. 
w. VA. GoDE ch. 49, art. 1, § 3 (Michie 1966). 
"W. VA. COUE ch. 49, art. 1, § 4 (9) (Michie 1966) . 
is Id. 
'"W. VA. CoDE ch. 49, art. 1, i 4(7) ~ichie 1966), 
•ra. · 
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tributes to, encourages or tends to cause . . ." a child under the 
age of eighteen years to associate "with immoral or vicious persons . 
. . ·.""The test for vagueness would be whether the meaning of an 
"immoral or vicious person" is definite enough so that men of 
ordinary intelligence would be apprised of the conduct prohibited 
by the statute. · 
In determining the outcome of future attacks on the constitu-
tionality of contributing to delinquency statutes, the test for vague• 
ness must be applied separately in each situation. While it is true 
that the statutes of some states, including West Virginia, contain 
words or phrases that seem to be vague and indefinite, it is difficult 
to determine how the test for vagueness will be applied by the var-
ious courts. The standards for determining vagueness where first 
amendment freedoms are not violated seem as vague and indefinite 
as the laws to which these standards might be applicable. It is there-
fore by no means certain whether the Hodges case will be followed 
or whether the courts will narrow the construction of the existing 
statutes and thereby save their constitutionality. · 
"'W. VA. CooE ¢. 49, art. 7, § 7 (Michie 1966); 
w. VA. Com: ch. 49, art. 1, § 4 ('1) (Michie 1966). 
Steven C. Hanley 
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